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| found on Reddit |
Up is down, left is right, front is back. I suppose it's all a matter of perspective, and if you come at something from the backdoor often enough you start to think it's the default way in and start calling it the front door.
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| found on Reddit |
Up is down, left is right, front is back. I suppose it's all a matter of perspective, and if you come at something from the backdoor often enough you start to think it's the default way in and start calling it the front door.
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| from here and here (image source) |
Whether you lock or encrypt a key, you'll need a key to unlock or decrypt it, so how do you protect that secondary key? You either get into an infinite loop of keys and locks/encryption or you accept that a less secure key unlocks the thing you're ultimately trying to protect.
In the case above, however, you could just break the glass, which is exactly the kind of backdoor authorities would love to see in encryption, but which would make us all less secure, just as this key is less secure because of the glass.
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| from here and here |
The revelation that Microsoft Office uses ECB (electronic codebook) mode for it's encryption (not just now but as far back as 2010) is stunning. If you've read a book on cryptography then you would know better than to use ECB mode. If you haven't read a book on cryptography then what the heck are you doing writing the crypto code in something as important as Microsoft Office?
How do you put someone so green in such a position? Alternatively, if it wasn't a mistake, if it wasn't a matter of a lack of experience (because the failings of ECB were widely known long, long before the creation of Office 2010 - I knew about it in university in the 90s) then could this have actually been a kind of backdoor?
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| from here and here |
Surely there are better ways of providing support than implementing a backdoor account. At the very least, a support account shouldn't have fixed, known credentials.
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| from here and here |
It's 2022 and apparently the European Union has learned nothing about mandating encryption backdoors.
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| from here and here (image source) |
Apple's CSAM (child sexual abuse material) scanning plans may now be paused, but paused isn't the same as stopped, and if they really think it's an advancement in privacy then it's important to recognize the distinction between paused and stopped.
In no world is adding surveillance where none previously existed an advancement in privacy, no matter how favourably it may compare to what others are doing. Furthermore, if your plan involves trying to work around the problem of encryption then you are once again not advancing privacy because, when it comes to privacy, encryption is not a problem that needs a work-around.
They still plan to go forward with this one way or another. They're just slowing down to consider how to take the bite out of the criticisms against it so that they can still pretend like they care about your privacy.
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| from here and here (image source) |
Not only did someone install this monstrosity, someone put a padlock on it, as if that could stop anyone from simply going around or under.
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| from here |
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| from here |
I always knew the government had it in them to gather evidence of criminal activity in spite of encrypted communications. They just had to put in the work instead of asking the tech industry for an Easy Button. Now that they've shown they can sell their own backdoored phones to criminals all over the world, read tens of millions of encrypted messages, and make nearly a thousand arrests (with more coming), they better realize they can't leverage their perceived helplessness in negotiations with tech companies any longer. Everyone knows what they're capable of and arguably their approach is better than anything the tech industry can do because it's much more targeted.
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| found on Reddit |
I wonder how the rest of this vulnerability disclosure story went. Was he locked up? Did future sewer workers just release information about secret tunnels into bank vaults to the general public? And if so, how did THAT turn out?
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| from here |
It's really revealing that the police want backdoors to use against other police, apparently oblivious to the fact that that would allow those other police to use the same backdoors against them (and a whole bunch of others). Clearly they aren't putting a lot of thought into this. All they know how to do is ask for more power.
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| from here and here |
Believe me, I can imagine how this backdoor got added to the Zyxel firmware. In theory they may be developing the firmware with the built-in account for testing purposes and then they remove or disable that code in the final build that they intend for release. But if that's what they're doing then this mistake begs to happen over and over again.
Maybe they should make a product that's testable in it's final releasable form instead.
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| from here and here |
The details of this spying are pretty laughable. Imagine doing something naughty after the government made you install a certificate that allows them to view your encrypted web traffic. You'd have to be pretty dumb to get caught, but it would suck not having the freedom to do what you want (or possibly need) to do. I suspect it does more to keep people in line than it does to actually catch people - not unlike the way obvious surveillance cameras deter some crime.
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| from here |
The lesson we should all learn from Zoom is that it's not really end-to-end encrypted if a middleman holds the keys.
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| from here |
Y'know what's better than telling the government what will happen to the backdoors they're asking for? Reminding them of what's already happened to the ones they had.
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| from here |
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| from here and here (image source) |
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| from here and here |
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| from here |
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| from here |